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a b s t r a c t
Oblivious transfer (OT) is a protocol where a receiver can obtain t-out-of-n services from
the sender without releasing anything about his choices. OT can be used to protect user’s
privacy. In principle, anyuser can interactwith a server to request some services. Thismight
allow some undesirable users to obtain services from the server. How to ensure that only
the authorized receivers can obtain services obliviously is a daunting task. In this paper,
we introduce oblivious signature based-on envelope (OSBE) to OT and propose two novel
OT schemes, which only allow the legitimate receivers to obtain services obliviously. The
receiver is required to authenticate himself to the issuer to possess the required credential
prior to access the protected services; while no authentication from the sender needs to
be done. The sender knows the number of the services selected by the receiver, but does
not know anything about his choices and personally identifiable information. The feature
of our scheme also lies in avoiding zero knowledge proofs and achieving all-or-nothing
non-transferable credentials. Our schemes are efficient in the cost of communication and
computation.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Although the Internet has brought enormous benefits to people, security andprivacy problemshave been amajor concern
to the users. Internet users are concerned with their privacy, and require their personally identifiable information (PII) not
to be collected, pilfered and illegally used. Although users believe that a small part of PII is insufficient for identifying the real
identity, the malicious attackers can aggregate the collected partial PII, such as health condition, financial data and hobbies,
to analyze and trace the real user. Lessons from identity theft, identity fraud, fictitious identity etc. suggest that PII should
be released under the user’s control in the critical moment.
Obviously, there is a trade-off between accountability and privacy. How to balance them is a challenging problem.
There have been some attempts toward a solution, such as identity management [1,2], user-centric systems [3–5], privacy-
preserving systems [6,7], anonymous credential [8–14], hidden credentials [15], k-time anonymous authentication [16–19].
These systems addressed the security of the user’s PII so that the user cannot be impersonated. In practice, the adversary
can trace and identify a user not only by the PII, but also by his activities, such as the websites he visited frequently and the
goods he purchased online. Therefore, in order to protect users’ privacy, we need a new system that captures the security
of both PII and services selected by a user. The following properties should be considered:
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1. Only the authorized users can access the protected services.
2. The service providers should not know anything about the user’s PII.
3. The service providers should not know anything about the contents of the services the user selected.
Suppose there exists a third trusted party (TTP) called the issuer, who is trusted by all participants in the system. Prior to
accessing the services, the user needs to authenticate himself to the issuer and obtain the required credentials. The user
can use these credentials to access the protected services, without revealing any information about his choice and PII to the
service providers. Such a systemcanbeused in somepractical scenarios. For example, in the library database system, the user
registers himself to the manager and then obtains a permission to access the database system. The database will record the
number of the items he accessed, without knowing anything about the contents of the selected items. The library can charge
the user according to the number recorded by the database. Both the PII and the selected services are not disseminated to
the database. Therefore, this system can resist against a malicious database that analyzes the user from the partial PII and
services. Other applications of this system can be found in the sensitive information system, where only qualified people
can access the protected services, such as patent search, DNA databases and multi-party computations.
Proposed by Rabin in 1981 [20], and extended by Brassaard, Crépeau and Robert in 1987 [21], k-out-of-n oblivious
transfer (OTnk) is a cryptographic primitive, where the sender and the receiver have messages M1,M2, . . . ,Mn and choices
σ1, σ2, . . . , σt ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, respectively. After a transfer, the receiver obtains messages Mσ1 ,Mσ2 , . . . ,Mσt , while the
sender cannot know anything about the receiver’s choices. Adaptive k-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OTnk×1), proposed by Naor
and Pinkas [22,23], allows the receiver to obtain services from the sender one by one adaptively, namely the i-th choice may
depend on the first i−1 choices. Therefore, adaptive k-out-of-n oblivious transfer can provide stronger security than k-out-
of-n oblivious transfer.
A drawback of OTnk×1 is that there is no limitation on the user; namely any one can interact with and receive services
from the server obliviously. There exist some attempts to prevent an illegal receiver from accessing the protected services.
Aiello, Ishai, and Reingold proposed a priced oblivious transfer based on homographic encryption and private information
retrieval (PIR) [24], where only if the price of the selected service is less than the remaining balance, can the receiver obtain
the service from the sender obliviously. Otherwise, the selected service will be denied. Subseqently, Crescenzo et al. [25]
proposed a conditional oblivious transfer schemewhere the receiver can access the protected service if and only if his secret
key satisfies the public predicate. Unfortunately, the privacy of users was not considered in these schemes.
Recently, Coull, Green and Hohenberger proposed an oblivious transfer with access control using state graphs [26]. In
this scheme, the receiver’s state shifts from one to another after each transition. If all states are used, the receiver cannot
access the protected services any longer. Camenisch, Dubovitskaya and Neven proposed another oblivious transfer with
access control [27,28], which is more efficient than the former. All these schemes work as follows:
1. The receiver authenticates himself to the issuer, and obtains the required credentials from him.
2. The receiver proves that he has possessed the required credentials to the sender in zero knowledge.
3. The receiver and the sender execute an oblivious transfer [29] to obtain the intended services.
In these schemes, the user needs to authenticate himself to the issuer and obtain credentials. Then, the receiver proves that
he is an authorized receiver to the sender in zero knowledge. Since the receiver needs to authenticate himself two times, the
cost of computation and communication is expensive. Recently, Camenisch, Dubovitskaya, Neven and Zaverucha proposed a
new oblivious transfer with access control scheme where a user can only knows whether he is granted to access the service
items and dose not know anything about the access control policies [30].
Proposed by Li et al. [31], oblivious signature-based envelope (OSBE) is a cryptographic primitive, where the receiver
can obtain the secret encapsulated in the envelop by the sender if and only if he has possessed a signature from the issuer
on the public message. Additionally, the receiver is not required to authenticate himself to the sender. The sender cannot
distinguish the receivers who have possessed credentials from the receivers who has not possessed credentials. Therefore,
the signature is a hidden credential [15].1 OSBE has been used in automated trust negotiation (ATN) [34], secure function
evaluation (SFE), secret handshakes [35]. Notably, the sender in OSBE cannot control the interaction. The reason is that the
sender encrypts the secret only under the parameters obtained from the issuer, instead of using his own private key.
Our contribution.
In this paper, we propose two novel efficient oblivious transfer schemes with access control. In our schemes, only
the authorized user (receiver) can obtain services from the server obliviously. The server knows how many items the
authorized user can obtain but it knows nothing about the contents of the selected items. Additionally, the receiver is
not required to authenticate himself to the server. Therefore, the user releases nothing about his PII to the server. Our
schemes do not require any zero knowledge proof, and hence, our scheme is more efficient than other schemes. We
propose the extended chosen-target computational Diffie–Hellman (XCT-CDH) assumption, which extends the chosen-
target computational Diffie–Hellman (CT-CDH) assumption, and proves that these two assumptions are equivalent.
Paper organization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, preliminaries required throughout this paper are described.
In Section 3, two efficient oblivious transfer with access control schemes are proposed and proven. The complexity of the
proposed schemes is analyzed. Section 4 concludes the paper.
1 This notion was proposed by Holt, Bradshaw, Seamons, and Orman in 2003, and has been used to protect users’ privacy [32,33].
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2. Preliminaries
In this section, we review the definition and security model of oblivious transfer with access control and introduce
the related assumptions. Based on the chosen-target computational Diffie–Hellman (CT-CDH) assumption, we propose the
extended CT-CDH (XCT-CDH) assumption, and prove that they are equivalent.
Unless noted otherwise, in the rest of this paper, byω
R← Ω , we denote thatω is chosen at random fromΩ . Especially, if
Ω is a finite set, ω
R← Ω denotes that ω is chosen uniformly fromΩ . By R Υ→ S and R Υ← S, we denote that party R sends Υ
to party S, and party S sendsΥ to party R, respectively. By y ← A(x), we denote that y is obtained by running algorithm A on
input x. We say that a function ϵ : Z→ R is a negligible function, if for all c ∈ Z there exists a n ∈ Z such that |ϵ(x)| < 1xc
for all x > n. By k, we denote a security parameter.We denoteKG(1k) as a key generator which takes as input k and outputs
a secret-public key pair.
2.1. Definition and security model
There are three entities in an oblivious transfer with an access control (OTAC) scheme: issuer I , sender S and receiver R.
The issuer authenticates the receivers, and issues credentials to them. The senders send the selected services to the receivers.
The receivers interact with the issuer and senders to obtain the required credentials and intended services. There are four
algorithms in an oblivious transfer with access control scheme:
• Setup. Taking as input the security parameter k, this algorithm responds with the system public parameters PP. The
issuer generates his secret-public key pair (isk, ipk) ← KG(1k). The sender generates his secret-public key pair
(ssk, spk)← KG(1k).
• Issue. Taking as input the secret key isk, the sender’s identifier si and the receiver’s identifier ri, it returns a credential to
the receiver.
• Commit. Taking as input the secret key ssk and n messages M1,M2, . . . ,Mn, this algorithm returns n ciphertext
C1, C2, . . . , Cn.
• Transfer. Taking as input the intended indexes σ1, σ2, . . . , σt and the secret key ssk, respectively, the receiver and the
sender interact. At the end, the receiver obtains the services Mσ1 ,Mσ2 , . . . ,Mσt , while the sender knows nothing about
the receiver’s choice.
Correctness: An OTAC scheme is correct if the receiver can obtain his intended messages when the sender and the receiver
follow the steps of the scheme.
Security model. Since the seminal introduction of oblivious transfer, there have been many literatures that discuss its
security. The security model of oblivious transfer can be classified into the following types: Honest-but curious model, half-
simulation [36] and full-simulation [29,37].
Proposed by Naor and Pinkas [36] in 2005, the half-simulation is a model where the issues of protecting the receiver
and the sender are separated. The security of the receiver requires that two transcripts which the receiver used to obtain
services Sσ and Sσ ′ are indistinguishable from the view of the sender. The security of the sender is defined by comparing
the real world and the ideal world experiments. In the real world experiment, the receiver and the sender run the protocol.
Meanwhile, in the ideal world experiment, the protocol is implemented by a trusted third party, Charlie. For any malicious
receiver A in the real world experiment, there exists a malicious receiver A′ that plays the role of A in the ideal world
experiment such that the outputs ofA andA′ are indistinguishable.
We define that an oblivious transfer with access control scheme is secure, if the following properties can be satisfied:
Privacy of the receiver.
1. The receiver releases nothing about his PII to the sender.
2. For any two different choice sets C = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σt} and C ′ = {σ ′1, σ ′2, . . . , σ ′t }, the transcripts received by the sender
corresponding toM = {Mσ1 ,Mσ2 , . . . ,Mσt } andM′ = {Mσ ′1 ,Mσ ′2 , . . . ,Mσ ′t } are indistinguishable. Especially, the choices
of the receiver are unconditionally secure, if the received services {Mσ1 ,Mσ2 , . . . ,Mσt } and {Mσ ′1 ,Mσ ′2 , . . . ,Mσ ′t } are
identically distributed.
Security of the sender. Suppose that the receiver has possessed the required credentials from the issuer. To define the security
of the sender, we compare the real world and the ideal world paradigms. In the real world, the receiver and the sender
execute the protocol. Meanwhile, in the ideal world, the functionality is replaced by a trusted third party (TTP). The sender
sends all his messages {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn} to the TTP. The receiver sends his choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σt} adaptively to the TTP. If
{σ1, σ2, . . . , σt} ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the TTP sends {Mσ1 ,Mσ2 , . . . ,Mσt } to the receiver. An oblivious transferwith access control
can protect the security of the sender, if for any receiver R in the real world, there exists an probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) receiver R′ in the ideal world such that the outputs of R and R′ are indistinguishable.
Semantic security. If the receiver has not obtained the required credentials from the issuer, he can obtain nothing about the
protected services.
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2.2. Security assumptions
Let G1,G2 and Gτ be multiplicative cyclic groups with prime order p, namely |G1| = |G2| = |Gτ | = p. Let g1 ∈ G1 and
g2 ∈ G2 be the generators of G1 and G2, respectively. A bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → Gτ satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinearity. for all θ ∈ G1, ϑ ∈ G2 and α, β ∈ Zp, e(θα, ϑβ) = e(θ, ϑ)αβ .
2. No-degeneracy. e(g1, g2) ≠ 1, where 1 is the identity in Gτ .
3. Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(θ, ϑ), for all θ ∈ G1, ϑ ∈ G2.
Let GG(1k) be a bilinear group generator that takes as input k and output the description of groups (G1,G2,Gτ ) with
prim order p and a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → Gτ . Let G(1k) be a group generator which takes as input k and output the
description of group Gwith prime order p.
Definition 1 (ℓ- Strong Diffie–Hellman (ℓ- SDH) Assumption [38]). Let (G1,G2,Gτ )← GG(1k) be a bilinear group. Let g1 and
g2 be the generators of G1 and G2, respectively. We say that ℓ-SDH assumption holds in (G1,G2,Gτ ), given ℓ + 2-tuple
(g1, g2, gx2, g
x2
2 , . . . , g
xℓ
2 ), if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA
Advℓ-SDHA (k) = Pr

γ , g
1
x+γ
1 ← A(g1, g2, gx2, gx
2
2 , . . . , g
xℓ
2 )

≤ ϵ(k)
where the probability is over the random choice of x ∈ Z∗p and the random bits consumed byA.
Definition 2 (Chosen-target Computational Diffie–Hellman (CT-CDH) Assumption [39]). Let g be a generator of group G ←
G(1k) with prime order p and x
R← Zp. LetH : {0, 1}∗ → G be a cryptographic hash function. There are two oracles TG(·)
and HG(·). TG(·) is called the target oracle, which takes as input j ∈ Zp, and responds with gj ∈ G. HG(·) is called the help
oracle, which takes as input gj ∈ G, and returns gxj ∈ G. Let QT and QH denote the numbers that the two oracles are queried,
respectively. CT-CDH assumption holds in G, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA
AdvCT-CDHA (1
k) = Pr ((ψ1, i1), . . . , (ψπ+1, iπ+1))← ATG(·),HG(·)(g, gx,H, p) ≤ ϵ(k)
where ψl = gxil , for l = 1, 2, . . . , π + 1, and QH < π + 1 ≤ QT .
Intuitively, CT-CDH assumption demonstrates that the adversary can query the help oracle on at most π elements in G,
and get back with these elements to the power x. If the orders of these π elements on the generator of G are unknown, the
adversary cannot compute a new element inG to the power of x, which orders on the generator and the π queried elements
are unknown. Based on CT-CDH assumption, we propose the extended CT-CDH (XCT-CDH) assumption. We replace the
target oracle in CT-CDH assumption with π + 1 random elements ofG. We will prove that the XCT-CD assumption and the
CT-CDH assumption are equivalent.
Definition 3 (EX tended Chosen-target Computational Diffie–Hellman (XCT-CDH) Assumption). Let g be a generator of the
groupG← G(1k)with prime order p, and x R← Zp. There is a help oracle HG(·), which takes as input gj ∈ G, returns gxj ∈ G.
Given (π + 1)-tuple {ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gaπ+1}, where al R← Z∗p for l = 1, 2, . . . , π + 1, XCT-CDH assumption holds in G, if for
all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA
AdvXCT-CDHA (K) = Pr[gxaiπ+1 ← AHG(·)(p, g, gx, gai1 , gai2 , . . . , gaiπ )] ≤ ϵ(k)
where ail ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , aπ+1}, for l = 1, 2, . . . , π + 1.
Theorem 1. Chosen-target computational Diffie–Hellman (CT-CDH) assumption and extended chosen-target computational
Diffie–Hellman (XCT-CDH) assumption are equivalent.
Proof. Given {ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gaπ+1}, we defineH : l → gail ∈ G, where ail ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , aπ+1}, for l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , π + 1};
otherwiseH : l → gbl , where bl R← Zp. So,H(·) is a cryptographic hash function.
On the one hand, if the adversaryA can break the CT-CDH assumption, wewill show that there exists an algorithmwhere
B can useA to break the XCT-CDH assumption. Given {ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gaπ+1}, for QT (QT ≤ π + 1) target oracle queries, the
challenger returns gai1 , gai2 , . . . , g
aiQT , where aij ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , aπ+1}, for j = 1, 2, . . . ,QT . For QH(QH ≤ π) help oracle
queries, the challenger queries the help oracle HG(·) in the XCT-CDH assumption, and returns gxai1 , gxai2 , . . . , gxaiQH , where
ait ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , aπ+1}, for t = 1, 2, . . . ,QH . If A can compute ψπ+1 = gxiπ+1 ,B can compute gxaiπ+1 = gxiπ+1 , where
H(π + 1) = giπ+1 = gaiπ+1 . So,B can break the XCT-CDH assumption.
On the other hand, if A can break the XCT-CDH assumption, we will show that there exists an algorithm where B can
useA to break the CT-CDH assumption. WhenA queries the help oracle on {gai1 , gai2 , . . . , gaiπ }, the challenger queries the
help oracle HG(·) in the CT-CDH assumption, and gets back with {gxai1 , gxai2 , . . . , gxaiπ }, where π = QH . If A can outputs
gxaiπ+1 ,B can compute ψπ+1 = gxiπ+1 , whereH(π + 1) = giπ+1 = gaiπ+1 and π + 1 = QH + 1 > QH . So,B can break the
CT-CDH assumption.
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Therefore, the chosen-target computational Diffie–Hellman (CT-CDH) assumption and the extended chosen-target
computational Diffie–Hellman (XCT-CDH) assumption are equivalent. 
Note that the extended chosen-target computational Diffie–Hellman (XCT-CDH) assumption is a computational
Diffie–Hellman (CDH) assumption, if the help oracle HG(·) in the XCT-CDH assumption is canceled.
Indistinguishability. We define that two distribution familiesΩ1(k) andΩ2(k) are (statistically) indistinguishable, if
y
| Prx∈Ω1(k)[x = y] − Prx∈Ω2(k)[x = y]| ≤ ϵ(k).
3. Oblivious transfer with access control
In this section, two efficient oblivious transfers with access control schemes are proposed. The first one is very simple,
while the credentials of the receiver are transferable. Comparatively, the second one sacrifices a little efficiency, while the
credentials of the receiver are all-or-nothing nontransferable, which means that all credentials are shared, if the receiver
shares one with others [8].
Overview. Our idea is as follows: at first, the receiver interacts with the issuer to obtain a credential, which is a signature on
a public message, for example the identifier of the sender in the trusted circle.2 Then, the sender commits his services using
OSBE under the public message and his private key. Finally, the receiver interacts with the sender, decrypts the ciphertexts
using the possessed credential, and obtains the intended services. In our schemes, only the qualified receivers can obtain
services from the sender obliviously, while not being required to authenticate (prove) themselves to the sender in zero
knowledge. Additionally, nothing about the protected services can be released to the illegal receiver, who has not obtained
the required credentials from the issuer.
3.1. Oblivious transfer with access control-I
Based on the short signature [38] and the oblivious transfer [40], we proposed an oblivious transfer with access control
scheme AC-OTnk×1-I, where only the receiver who has possessed the required credential can get services from the sender
adaptively, without releasing anything about his PII and the contents of the selected service to the sender. The sender knows
how many services the receiver can obtain if he has possessed a credential, but knows nothing about the credential of the
receiver. AC-OTnk×1-I is described in Fig. 1.
Theorem 2. AC-OTnk×1-I is correct.
Proof. If the receiver R holds a credential (σ , r), he can compute
Aij = e(σ , Cij,1)
= e

g
1
x+r , (yhr)tij

= e

g
1
x+r , hx+r
tij
= e(g, h)tij ,
and
Cij,2
Eij
= e(g, h)
ztij ·Mij
D
s−1j
ij
= e(g, h)
ztij ·Mij
B
zs−1j
ij
= e(g, h)
ztij ·Mij
Azij
= e(g, h)
ztij ·Mij
e(g, h)ztij
= Mij . 
Theorem 3. AC-OTnk×1-I is unconditionally receiver-secure.
2 Trusted circle is a domain where all participants trust the issuer.
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Fig. 1. Oblivious transfer with access control-I (AC-OTnk×1-I).
Proof. For any Bij received by the sender from the receiver, there exists an sw ∈ Zq(w ≠ j) such that Bij = Asjij = e(g, h)
sjtij =
e(g, h)sw tiw = Aswiw = Biw , namely sw =
sjtij
tiw
mod q.
So, from the view of the sender, Bij is computed from Cij,1 or Ciw ,1 is identically distributed. AC-OT
n
k×1-I is unconditionally
receiver-secure. 
Theorem 4. AC-OTnk×1-I is sender-secure, if the XCT-CDH assumption holds in Gτ .
Proof. For any probabilistic polynomial-time malicious receiver Rˆ in the real model, we can construct an probabilistic
polynomial-time malicious receiver Rˆ∗ in the ideal model such that the outputs of Rˆ and Rˆ∗ are indistinguishable.
1. S sendsM1,M2, . . . ,Mn to the trusted third party, Charlie.
2. Rˆ∗ sends C∗1 , C
∗
2 , . . . , C
∗
n to Charlie, where C
∗
i = (C∗i1 , C∗i2)
R← G2τ , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
3. Rˆ∗ monitors the outputs of Rˆ. If Rˆ can compute Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Aik and Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , Bik , Rˆ
∗ chooses A∗i1 , A
∗
i2
, . . . , A∗ik and
B∗i1 , B
∗
i2
, . . . , B∗ik , where A
∗
iv , B
∗
iv
R← Gτ , for v = 1, 2, . . . , k.
4. When Rˆ takes as input Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , Bik to obtain Di1 ,Di2 , . . . ,Dik , Rˆ
∗ queries the help oracle HGτ (·) on B∗i1 , B∗i2 , . . . , B∗ik ,
and gets back with D∗i1 ,D
∗
i2
, . . . ,D∗ik , where D
∗
iw = Bz
∗
ij
, forw = 1, 2, . . . , k.
5. If Rˆ can compute Eij = e(g, h)ztij , Rˆ∗ sends ij to Charlie. Charlie returns
C∗ij,2
Mij
.
6. Rˆ∗ outputs (A∗i1 , A
∗
i2
, . . . , A∗ik , B
∗
i1
, B∗i2 , . . . , B
∗
ik
, D∗i1 ,D
∗
i2
, . . . ,D∗ik , C
∗
1 , C
∗
2 , . . . , C
∗
n ).
If Rˆ obtains k + 1 messages, Rˆ∗ does not know which k indices are really selected by Rˆ. The simulation fails. Otherwise, we
will show that Rˆ can get at most kmessages under the XCT-CDH assumption. If Rˆ can get k + 1 messages, he can compute
Eij , for j = 1, 2, . . . , k+ 1. Namely, after receiving (e(g, h)ti1 )z, (e(g, h)ti2 )z, . . . , (e(g, h)tik )z, Rˆ can compute (e(g, h)tik+1 )z .
This contradicts to the XCT-CDH assumption. So, Rˆ can obtain at most kmessages from the sender.
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{Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Aik} and {Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , Bik} are random elements in Gτ . C1, C2, . . . , Cn are random elements in G2 ×
Gτ . {Di1 ,Di2 , . . . ,Dik} and {D∗i1 ,D∗i2 , . . . ,D∗ik} are identically distributed. Therefore, the outputs of Rˆ and Rˆ∗ are
indistinguishable. 
Theorem 5. AC-OTnk×1-I is semantically secure under the ℓ-SDH assumption and XCT-CDH assumption.
Proof. There are two types of adversaries:
Type-I: The adversary can compute Ai = e(g, h)ti , then he can act as the authorized receiver to interact with the sender.
Type-II: The adversary can compute the decryption key e(g, h)zti from Ci.
We will show that a Type-I adversary can be used to break the ℓ-SDH assumption or XCT-CDH assumption, and a Type-II
adversary can be used to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Type-I: Suppose thatA is a Type-I adversary.
1. If A can compute the signature (σ , r), then compute Ai, Bi, and Ei. There exists an algorithm where B can use A to
break the ℓ-SDH assumption.3
2. If A cannot compute σ , he can compute Ai from Ci,1 = (yhr)ti . If it is, there exists an algorithm where B can use A
to break the XCT-CDH assumption as follows: Given e(g, Ci,1) = (e(g, h)x+r)ti and e(g, h), the aim ofB is to compute
e(g, h)ti .B sends Ci,1 toA, ifA can compute e(g, h)ti ,B aborts.B can useA to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Type-II: Suppose that A is a Type-II adversary. If A can compute e(g, h)zti from Ci,1, there exists an algorithm where B
can use A to break the XCT-CDH assumption as follows: Given (e(g, h)x+r)ti , and e(g, h)z , the aim of B is to compute
(e(g, h)z)ti .B sends Ci = (Ci,1, Ci,2) toA. IfA can computeMi,B aborts.B can compute e(g, h)zti = Ci,2Mi . SoB can use
A to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Therefore, AC-OTnk×1-I is semantically secure. 
Complexity. Suppose that e(g, h) can be pre-computed. In the setup stage, the issuer needs to compute one exponentiation,
and sends one element in Zq to the sender. The sender needs to compute one exponentiation. In the issue phase, the issuer
needs to compute one exponentiation, and sends one element in G1 and one element in Zp to the receiver. The receiver
needs to compute one exponentiation and one pairing. In the commitment phase, the sender needs to compute 2n + 1
exponentiations, and sends n elements in G2 and n elements in Gτ to the receiver. In the transfer phase, the receiver needs
to compute k pairings and 2k exponentiations, and sends k elements in Gτ to the sender. The sender needs to compute k
exponentiations, and sends k elements inGτ to the receiver. The costs of computation and communication in our AC-OTnk×1-I
are listed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. By e and p, we denote one exponentiation and one paring computing, respectively.
By E1, Eτ and Eq, we denote one element in G1,Gτ and Gq, respectively.
3.2. Oblivious transfer with access control-II
Based on the signature [17],4 and the oblivious transfer [40], we propose an oblivious transfer with access control
AC-OTnk×1-II, where only the authorized receivers can obtain services from the sender adaptively. The sender knows the
number of the services the receiver can obtain if he has been authorized, but knows nothing about the contents of the
selected services. Additionally, the credential of the receiver is all-or-nothingnon-transferable. Namely, our scheme captures
the following properties:
1. Zero knowledge proof is not required.
2. The receiver is not required to authenticate himself to the sender.
3. The sender knows the number of the services that can be obtained by the authorized receiver, and nothing about the
contents of the selected services.
4. The receiver cannot share his credentials with others.
AC-OTnk×1-II is described in Fig. 2.
Theorem 6. AC-OTnk×1-II is correct.
Proof. If the receiver R has obtained a credential (σ , s, r), he can compute
Aij = e(σ , Cij,1)
= e

(g0g s1g
xu
2 )
1
x+r , (yhr)tij

= e

(g0g s1g
xu
2 )
1
x+r , hx+r
tij
= e(g0g s1gxu2 , h)tij
= e(g0, h)tij e(g1, h)stij e(g2, h)xutij ,
3 The short signature is existentially unforgeable against the weakly chosen message attack under the ℓ-SDH assumption [38].
4 This signature scheme was proposed by Boneh et al. [41], and modified and proven secure by Au et al. [17].
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Table 1
The computation cost in AC-OTnk×1-I scheme.
Scheme Computation cost
Setup Issue Commitment phase Transfer phase
I R S I R S R S R
AC-OTnk×1-I e 0 e e e+ 2p (2n+ 1)e 0 ke 2ke+kp
Table 2
The communication cost in AC-OTnk×1-I scheme.
Scheme Communication cost
Setup Issue Commitment phase Transfer phase
I→S I→R I→S S→R R→S S→R R→S
AC-OTnk×1-I Eq E1 + Eq 0 nE2 + nEτ 0 kEτ kEτ
Bij =

Aij
C sij,2C
xu
ij,3
sj
=

e(g0, h)
tij e(g1, h)
stij e(g2, h)
xutij
e(g1, h)
stij e(g2, h)
xutij
sj
= e(g0, h)sjtij ,
Eij = D
s−1j
ij
= Bzs
−1
j
ij
= e(g0, h)ztij ,
and
Cij,4
Eij
= e(g0, h)
ztij ·Mij
e(g0, h)
ztij
= Mij . 
Theorem 7. AC-OTnk×1-II is unconditionally receiver-secure.
Proof. For any Bij received by the sender from the receiver, there exists an su ∈ Zq(u ≠ j) such that Bij = Asjij = e(g, h)
sjtij =
e(g, h)sutiu = Asuiu = Biu , namely su =
sjtij
tiu
mod q.
Hence, from the view of the sender, Bij is computed from Cij,1 or Ciu,1 is identically distributed. AC-OT
n
k×1-II is
unconditionally receiver-secure. 
Theorem 8. AC-OTnk×1-II is sender-secure, if the XCT-CDH assumption holds in Gτ .
Proof. For any probabilistic polynomial-time malicious Rˆ in the real model, we can construct an probabilistic polynomial-
time malicious Rˆ∗ in the ideal model such that the outputs of Rˆ and Rˆ∗ are indistinguishable.
1. S sendsM1,M2, . . . ,Mn to the trusted third party Charlie.
2. Rˆ∗ sends C∗1 , C
∗
2 , . . . , C
∗
n to Charlie, where C
∗
i = (C∗i1 , C∗i2 , C∗i3 , C∗i4)
R← G2 × G3τ , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
3. Rˆ∗ monitors the outputs of Rˆ. If Rˆ can compute Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Aik and Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , Bik , Rˆ
∗ chooses A∗i1 , A
∗
i2
, . . . , A∗ik and
B∗i1 , B
∗
i2
, . . . , B∗ik , where A
∗
iw , B
∗
iw
R← Gτ , forw = 1, 2, . . . , k.
4. When Rˆ takes as input Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , Bik to obtain Di1 ,Di2 , . . . ,Dik , Rˆ
∗ queries the help oracle HGτ (·) on B∗i1 , B∗i2 , . . . , B∗ik ,
and gets back with D∗i1 ,D
∗
i2
, . . . ,D∗ik , where D
∗
iw = Bz
∗
iw , forw = 1, 2, . . . , k.
5. If Rˆ can compute Eij = e(g0, h)ztij , Rˆ∗ sends ij to Charlie. Charlie returns
C∗ij,4
Mij
.
6. Rˆ∗ outputs (A∗i1 , A
∗
i2
, . . . , A∗ik , B
∗
i1
, B∗i2 , . . . , B
∗
ik
, D∗i1 ,D
∗
i2
, . . . ,D∗ik , C
∗
1 , C
∗
2 , . . . , C
∗
n ).
If Rˆ obtains k + 1 messages, Rˆ∗ does not know which k indices are really selected by Rˆ. The simulation fails. Otherwise, we
will show that Rˆ can get at most kmessages under the XCT-CDH assumption. If Rˆ can get k+1messages, he can compute Eij ,
for j = 1, 2, . . . , k+ 1. Namely, after receiving (e(g0, h)ti1 )z, (e(g0, h)ti2 )z, . . . , (e(g0, h)tik )z, Rˆ can compute (e(g0, h)tik+1 )z .
This contradicts the XCT-CDH assumption. Hence, Rˆ can obtain at most kmessages.
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Fig. 2. Oblivious transfer with access control-II (AC-OTnk×1-II).
{Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Aik} and {Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , Bik} are random elements in Gτ . {C1, C2, . . . , Cn} are random elements in G2 × G3.{Di1 ,Di2 , . . . ,Dik} and {D∗i1 ,D∗i2 , . . . ,D∗ik} are identically distributed.
Therefore, the outputs of Rˆ and Rˆ∗ are indistinguishable. 
Theorem 9. AC-OTnk×1-II is semantically secure under the ℓ-SDH assumption and XCT-CDH assumption.
Proof. There are two types of adversaries:
Type-I: The adversary can compute Aˆi = e(g, h)ti , then he can act as the authorized receiver to interact with the sender.
Type-II: The adversary can compute the decryption key e(g, h)zti from Ci.
We will show that a Type-I adversary can be used to break the ℓ-SDH assumption or XCT-CDH assumption and a Type-II
adversary can be used to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Type-I: Suppose thatA is a Type-I adversary.
1. IfA can forge a signature (σ ∗, r, s∗) on x∗u , then computing Ai, Bi, and Ei, there exists an algorithmwhereB can useA
to break the ℓ-SDH assumption.5
2. If A cannot compute (σ ∗, r, s∗), he can compute Aˆi from Ci,1, Ci,2, Ci,3. If it is, there exists an algorithm where B can
useA to break the XCT-CDH assumption as follows: Given e(g, Ci,1) = (e(g, h)x+r)ti , e(g1, h)ti , e(g2, h)ti and e(g0, h),
the aim ofB is to compute e(g0, h)ti .B sends Ci,1, Ci,2, Ci,3 toA, ifA can compute e(g0, h)ti ,B aborts.B can useA to
break the XCT-CDH assumption.
5 The signature is existentially unforgeable against the adaptively chosen messages attack under the ℓ-SDH assumption [17].
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Table 3
The computation cost in our AC-OTnk×1-II scheme.
Scheme Computation cost
Setup Issue Commitment phase Transfer phase
I R S I R S R S R
AC-OTnk×1-II e e e 2e 2e+ 2p (4n+ 1)e 0 ke 4ke+kp
Table 4
The communication cost in our AC-OTnk×1-II scheme.
Scheme Communication cost
Setup Issue Commitment phase Transfer phase
I→S I→R I→S S→R R→S S→R R→S
AC-OTnk×1-I Eq E1 + 2Eq 0 nE2 + 3nEτ 0 kEτ kEτ
Type-II: Suppose that A is Type-II adversary. If A can compute e(g0, h)zti from Ci,1, Ci,2, Ci,3, there exists an algorithm
where B can use A to break the XCT-CDH assumption as follows: Given e(g, Ci,1) = (e(g, h)x+r)ti , e(g1, h)ti , e(g2, h)ti
and Z = e(g0, h)z , the aim ofB is to compute (e(g0, h)z)ti .B sends Ci = (Ci,1, Ci,2, Ci,3, Ci,4) toA, ifA can computeMi,B
aborts.B can compute e(g0, h)zti = Ci,4Mi . So,B can useA to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Therefore, AC-OTnk×1-II is semantically secure. 
Complexity. Suppose that e(g0, h), e(g1, h) and e(g2, h) can be pre-computed. In the setup stage, the issuer needs to compute
one exponentiation, and sends one element in Zq to the sender. The receiver needs to compute one exponentiation. The
sender needs to compute one exponentiation. In the issue phase, the issuer needs to compute two exponentiations and
sends one element in G1 and two elements in Zq to the receiver. The receiver needs to compute two exponentiations and
two parings. In the commitment phase, the sender needs to compute 4n+1 exponentiations, and sends n elements inG2 and
3n elements in Gτ to the receiver. In the transfer phase, the receiver needs to compute k pairings and 4k exponentiations,
and send k elements inGτ to the sender. The sender needs to compute k exponentiations, and sends k elements inGτ to the
receiver. The costs of computation and communication in our AC-OTnk×1-II are listed in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
4. Conclusion
One of the fundamental challenges in an open communication channel is to protect user’s privacy, including both PII
and the selected services. In this paper, we proposed two efficient oblivious transfers with access control schemes. In our
schemes, the receiver can obtain services from the sender adaptively if he has been authorized by the issuer. The sender
knows the number of the selected items, but nothing about the receiver’s choices and his PII. The receiver is required to
authenticate himself to the issuer to obtain a credential, and is not required to prove that he is an authorized receiver to
the sender. Notably, there is no need for zero knowledge proof. The credentials in the first scheme are transferable, and
all-or-nothing non-transferable in the second one.
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